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ABSTRACT
Manufacturers of smart home Internet of Things (IoT) devices are
increasingly adding voice assistant and audio monitoring features
to a wide range of devices including smart speakers, televisions,
thermostats, security systems, and doorbells. Consequently, many
of these devices are equipped with microphones, raising significant
privacy concerns: users may not always be aware of when audio
recordings are sent to the cloud, or who may gain access to the
recordings. In this paper, we present the LeakyPick architecture
that enables the detection of the smart home devices that stream
recorded audio to the Internet without the user’s consent. Our proof-
of-concept is a LeakyPick device that is placed in a user’s smart
home and periodically “probes” other devices in its environment and
monitors the subsequent network traffic for statistical patterns that
indicate audio transmission. Our prototype is built on a Raspberry
Pi for less than USD $40 and has a measurement accuracy of 94%
in detecting audio transmissions for a collection of 8 devices with
voice assistant capabilities. Furthermore, we used LeakyPick to
identify 89 words that an Amazon Echo Dot misinterprets as its
wake-word, resulting in unexpected audio transmission. LeakyPick
provides a cost effective approach for regular consumers to monitor
their homes for unexpected audio transmissions to the cloud.
1 INTRODUCTION
Consumer Internet of Things (IoT) devices have emerged as a
promising technology to enhance home automation and physical
safety. While the smart home ecosystem has a sizeable collection
of automation platforms, market trends in the US [44] suggest that
many consumers are gravitating towards AmazonAlexa andGoogle
Home. These two platforms are unique from the other automation
platforms (e.g., Samsung SmartThings, WeMo) in that they focused
much of their initial smart home efforts into smart speaker tech-
nology, which allows users to speak commands to control smart
home devices (e.g., light switches), play music, or make simple in-
formation queries. This dominance of Amazon Alexa and Google
Home might suggest that consumers find voice commands more
useful than complex automation configurations.
Formany privacy-conscious consumers, having Internet-connected
microphones scattered around their homes is a concerning prospect.
Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
2020. ACM ISBN 978-x-xxxx-xxxx-x/YY/MM. . . $15.00
https://doi.org/10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn
This danger was recently confirmed when popular news media re-
ported that Amazon [27], Google [23, 31], Apple [24], Microsoft [13],
and Facebook [18] are all using contractors to manually analyze the
accuracy of voice transcription. The news reports include anecdotes
from contractors indicating they listened to many drug deals, do-
mestic violence, and private conversations. Perhaps more concern-
ing is that many of the recordings were the result of false positives
when determining the “wake-word” for the platform. That is, the
user never intended for the audio to be sent to the cloud.
Unfortunately, avoiding microphones is not as simple as not
purchasing smart speakers. Microphones have become a perva-
sive sensor for smart home devices. For example, it is difficult to
find a smart television that does not support voice controls via the
display or the handheld remote control. Smart thermostats (e.g.,
Ecobee) commonly advertise that they have dual function as a smart
speaker. Surveillance cameras (e.g., Ring, Wyze) are designed to
notify users of events, but are in fact always recording. Perhaps
most concerning was the report that the Nest security system in-
cludes a microphone [27], despite no packing material or product
documentation reporting its existence. While the manufacturers of
these devices might argue that users can disable microphone func-
tionality in device software, history has repeatedly demonstrated
that software can and will be compromised. Furthermore, mass
collection and storage of audio recordings increases concerns over
the potential for a “surveillance state” (e.g., Ring has recently been
criticized for working with local police [22]).
Our research seeks to answer the question: How can a user effec-
tively detect if a device is using the microphone to capture the user’s
voice and record them without their knowledge? We are primarily
concerned with the benign, but hidden, recording and transmission
of audio to cloud services, as such behaviors can potentially lead to
mass surveillance. We also seek to identify the existence of com-
promised devices that immediately transmit audio to the network
as it is recorded. We believe there is significant utility in detecting
this subset of compromised devices, particularly given the limited
storage capacity of many low-level IoT devices.
Existing approaches for identifying unintended data transmis-
sions out of the user’s network [11, 29] focus on other modalities
(e.g., video) and rely on assumptions that do not apply to audio
transmissions (e.g., some devices require an utterance of specific
wake-words). Furthermore, while traffic analysis approaches target-
ing IoT devices have been proposed [33, 41], to the best of our knowl-
edge there are no earlier approaches specifically targeting traffic of
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microphone-enabled IoT devices. Additionally, prior work attacking
voice assistants and voice recognition [3, 7, 8, 14, 28, 30, 40, 46, 49–
51] focuses on maliciously issuing commands or changing the in-
teraction flow without the victim noticing.
In this paper, we present the LeakyPick architecture, which in-
cludes a small device that can be placed in various rooms of a
home to detect the existence of smart home devices that stream
recorded audio to the Internet. LeakyPick operates by periodically
“probing” an environment (i.e., creating noise) when the user is not
home (to avoid annoyance) and monitoring subsequent network
traffic for statistical patterns that indicate the transmission of audio
content. We evaluate LeakyPick by studying several popular voice
assistants, which provide ground truth for analysis. Our evalua-
tion shows that LeakyPick has an observed accuracy of 94% for
detecting the transmission of audio. LeakyPick achieves this accu-
racy using a statistical approach that is generalizable to a broad
selection of voice-enabled IoT devices, eliminating the need for
time-consuming training required by machine learning. We also
used LeakyPick to perform a wake-word fuzz test of an Amazon
Echo Dot, discovering 89 words that unexpectantly stream audio
recordings to Amazon. In doing so, LeakyPick provides a cost ef-
fective approach for regular consumers to monitor their homes for
unexpected audio transmissions to the cloud.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• We present the LeakyPick device for identifying smart home
devices that unexpectedly record and send audio to the Internet.
The device costs less thanUSD $40 and can be easily deployed
in multiple rooms of a home.
• We present a novel audio-based probing approach for esti-
mating the likelihood that particular devices react to specific
audio-based keywords. Our approach has a 94% accuracy for
a set of devices known to transmit audio to the cloud. We
also show that the approach is generalizable to different
device types without the need to pre-train costly device-
type-specific detection profiles.
• We show that LeakyPick can identify hidden wake-words that
cause unexpected audio transmission. Our analysis of an Ama-
zon Echo Dot identified 89 incorrect wake-words.
Finally, LeakyPick uses human-audible noises, which may be
annoying to physically present users. Prior work has suggested the
use of inaudible sound to control voice assistants using ultrasound
audio [42, 50]. However, these approaches are specific to the tech-
nical characteristics of the targeted devices. Therefore, they are not
immediately applicable to our goal of identifying unknown devices
streaming audio. We leave the task of creating generic models of
transmitting audio via ultrasonic sound as a topic for future work.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides background on devices with voice control and audio interfaces.
Section 3 overviews our architecture. Section 4 describes our design
and implementation. Section 5 evaluates the accuracy of LeakyP-
ick. Section 6 discusses our approach and security considerations.
Section 7 overviews related work. Section 8 concludes.
2 BACKGROUND
IoT devices increasingly use audio sensing for enabling voice-based
control by the user or for other audio-based use cases. Examples of
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word
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Figure 1: Overview of wake-word detection process in voice-
controlled devices such as the Amazon Echo
such devices include smart audio security systems [25], smart audio
event-detecting IP cameras [20], vacuum cleaner robots equipped
with microphones and nightvision [6], and smart fire alarms with
a self-testing siren [19]. Due to the abundance of devices with
audio sensing capabilities, the user may not always be aware of
when a particular device will record audio and send it to the cloud.
Sending audio to the cloud is frequently required for voice-control
based user interfaces, as speech-to-text translation often needs
more computational resources than are available on IoT devices.
Devices with voice-control interfaces typically use local speech
recognition for detecting a specific set of “wake-words” (i.e., ut-
terances meant to be used by the user to invoke the voice-control
functionality of the device). When the local model detects the utter-
ance of a potential wake-word, the device starts sending audio to
back-end servers for voice-to-text translation. In order to not miss
speech commands uttered by users, the local model needs to be
configured to recognize any utterance that resembles the intended
wake-word. In case of the Alexa voice assistant, it is then the task
of the back-end service to verify whether the observed utterance
really represents a wake-word or not, as it is equipped with a more
comprehensive speech recognition model and is not limited by
the potentially scarce computational capabilities of the IoT device
recording the audio. Figure 1 overviews this typical approach.
Problems arise when the local or online detection model mis-
takenly classifies specific audio inputs as the wake-word and con-
sequently starts sending the recorded audio to the cloud, thereby
potentially leaking sensitive information. Private information may
also be leaked unintentionally when the user is unaware that a
device will react to specific wake-words.
Finally, attacks targeting voice assistants can use malicious audio
signal injection to trick the assistant to perform actions desired by
the adversary. In these attacks, the adversary either waits for the
user to be asleep or not present [3, 14] or uses inaudible [30, 42, 50]
or unrecognizable [7, 40, 46, 49] signals to stage the attack, making
it very difficult for the victim user to realize that the device is being
attacked. Our goal is to provide tools that enable users to detect
audio-related transmissions by IoT devices in their network and
inform the user when their audio-enabled devices transmit audio,
thus making such attacks visible to the user.
2
LeakyPick: IoT Audio Spy Detector Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
ThreatModel and Assumptions: In this paper, we are concerned
with threats related to IoT devices that stream recorded audio over
the Internet using Wi-Fi or a wired LAN connection in response to
audio signals recognised by the device as potential voice commands
or different sounds the device reacts to. As processing voice com-
mands is (except for the detection of the device’s wake-word) imple-
mented on the server-side, we assume that recorded audio is trans-
mitted instantaneously to the cloud to allow the voice-controlled
device to promptly react to user commands. We consider three main
threat scenarios:
(1) Audio events or utterances inadvertently recognized by the
device as the device’s wake-word, resulting in the unwanted
streaming of audio recordings to the device’s back-end system
for further processing. The main threat in this scenario is
the unintentional disclosure of potentially sensitive audio to
the back-end system of the device’s vendor.
(2) Active attacks by an external adversary as discussed above,
where the adversary tricks the targeted device to initiate
transmission of audio data by injection of audio signals to the
device’s environment so that the device will identify these
as its wake-word. The main threat in this scenario is the
unauthorized invocation of device or service functionalities.
(3) Application-level attacks that cause a benign IoT device to
send audio without the user’s knowledge. For example, the
Amazon Echo contained a vulnerability [21] that allowed a
malicious skill to silently listen. More recently, security re-
searchers have reported [32] the existence of eavesdropping
apps targeting Alexa and Google Assistant.
Our threat model primarily considers benign IoT devices, i.e.,
devices not compromised by an adversary. We do not consider
scenarios in which an IoT device is modified by the adversary to
transform the device to act as a bugging device that records and
stores audio locally without sending it to the network. While feasi-
ble, such attacks are much less scalable, as they must be tailored
for each targeted device and are only applicable for devices with
sufficient storage space. We note, however, that LeakyPick is ap-
plicable to settings where an adversary has compromised an IoT
device and immediately transmits audio data.
3 SOLUTION OVERVIEW
The goal of this paper is to devise a method for regular users to
reliably identify IoT devices that 1) are equipped with a microphone,
and 2) send recorded audio from the user’s home to external ser-
vices without the user’s awareness. If LeakyPick can identify which
network packets contain audio recordings, it can then inform the
user which devices are sending audio to the cloud, as the source of
network packets can be identified by hardware network addresses.
This provides a way to identify both unintentional transmissions of
audio to the cloud, as well as above-mentioned attacks (discussed
in detail in Section 7), where adversaries seek to invoke specific
actions by injecting audio into the device’s environment. Achieving
this goal requires overcoming the following research challenges:
• Device traffic is often encrypted. A naïve solution that simply
looks for audio codecs in network traffic will fail to identify
most audio recordings.
Probing Device Gateway
Get traffic
IoT device Internet
Figure 2: System set-up of LeakyPick
• Device types are not known a priori. Devices transmit audio
in different ways. We need to identify generic approaches
that work with previously unseen devices.
Due to these challenges, our solution cannot passively monitor
network traffic with the goal of differentiating the transmission of
audio recordings from other network traffic.While prior approaches
such as HomeSnitch [34] are able to classify the semantic behavior
of IoT device transmissions (e.g., voice command), they require a
priori training for each manufacturer or device model. Since we
seek to identify this behavior for potentially unknown devices, we
cannot rely on supervised or semi-supervised machine learning.
At a high level, LeakyPick overcomes the research challenges
by periodically transmitting audio into a room and monitoring the
subsequent network traffic from devices. As shown in Figure 2,
LeakyPick’s main component is a probing device that emits au-
dio probes into its vicinity. By temporally correlating these audio
probes with observed characteristics of subsequent network traffic,
LeakyPick identifies devices that have potentially reacted to the
audio probes by sending audio recordings.
LeakyPick identifies network flows containing audio recordings
using two key ideas. First, it looks for traffic bursts following an au-
dio probe. Our observation is that voice-activated devices typically
do not send much data unless they are active. For example, our
analysis shows that when idle, Alexa-enabled devices periodically
send small data bursts every 20 seconds, medium bursts every 300
seconds, and large bursts every 10 hours. We further found that
when it is activated by an audio stimulus, the resulting audio trans-
mission burst has distinct characteristics. However, using traffic
bursts alone results in high false positive rates.
Second, LeakyPick uses statistical probing. Conceptually, it first
records a baseline measurement of idle traffic for each monitored
device. Then it uses an independent two-sample t-test to compare
the features of the device’s network traffic while being idle and
of traffic when the device communicates after the audio probe.
This statistical approach has the benefit of being inherently device
agnostic. As we show in Section 5, this statistical approach performs
as well as machine learning approaches, but is not limited by a priori
knowledge of the device. It therefore outperforms machine learning
approaches in cases where there is no pre-trained model for the
specific device type available.
Finally, LeakyPick works for both devices that use a wake word
and devices that do not. For devices such as security cameras that
do not use a wake word, LeakyPick does not need to perform any
special operations. Transmitting any audio will trigger the audio
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transmission. To handle devices that use a wake word or sound,
e.g., voice assistants, security systems reacting on glass shattering
or dog barking, LeakyPick is configured to prefix its probes with
known wake words and noises (e.g., "Alexa", "Hey Google"). It can
also be used to fuzz test wake-words to identify words that will
unintentionally transmit audio recordings.
4 LEAKYPICK DESIGN
This section describes the central aspects of LeakyPick’s design.
We primarily focus on audio event detection. We then describe our
system implementation on a Raspbery Pi 3B.
4.1 Audio Event Detection
Due to the encryption between devices and back-end cloud systems,
it is not possible to detect audio-related events by inspecting packet
payloads. Instead, LeakyPick identifies audio transmissions by ob-
serving sudden outgoing traffic rate increases for specific devices, or
significant changes in the device’s communication behavior, both
of which can indicate the transmission of audio recordings. We
consider two possible complementary approaches to audio event
detection: (1) a simple baseline method based on network traffic
burst detection, and (2) a statistical approach for detecting apparent
changes in the communication characteristics of monitored devices
in response to performed audio probes.
4.1.1 Burst Detection. Our baseline approach for detecting audio
transmissions is based on burst detection in the observed network
traffic of devices. To do this, we need to first identify the character-
istics of potential audio transmissions. We therefore analyzed the
invocation process and data communication behavior of popular
microphone-enabled IoT devices when they transmit audio.
Our traffic analysis was based on data of popular IoT devices with
integrated virtual assistant support: (1) Echo Dot (Amazon Alexa),
(2) Google Home (Google Assistant), (3) Home Pod (Apple Siri),
and (4) an audio-activated home security system (Hive Hub 360).
Our analysis showed that these devices do not typically send much
traffic during normal standby operation. Therefore, it is possible to
detect audio transmissions through the increase in traffic rate they
cause. Our approach is generic in the sense that it is applicable to all
devices sending audio. We chose these microphone-enabled devices,
as they are popular devices produced for a broad range of use cases.
To determine the parameters for burst detection, we monitored the
network traffic of devices in response to audio probes emitted into
the devices’ environment.
We perform audio event detection by observing sudden increases
in the traffic rate emitted by a device that is sustained for a spe-
cific amount of time. This is because an audio transmission will
inevitably cause an increase in the data rate that will typically last
at least for the duration of the transmitted audio sample. This is
consistent with how most voice-controlled IoT devices utilizing
cloud-based back-ends function (Section 2), where local wake-word
detection causes subsequent audio to be streamed to the back-end.
Specifically, LeakyPick performs burst detection by dividing
the network traffic originating from a device into time windows
W = (w1,w2, . . .) of size sw and calculating for each time window
wi the sum of packet payload sizes of the packets falling within the
window. We then calculate the average traffic rate Bi during the
Table 1: Parameters and packet features used by our Burst
Detection and Statistical Probing approaches
Approach Parameters Packet Features
Burst Detection Window size sw Packet size
Traffic rate Baudio MAC/IP
Consecutive detections n
Statistical Probing Bin count k Packet size
Packet sequence duration d Interarrival time
P-value threshold t MAC/IP
time windowwi in bytes per second. If the traffic rate Bi is above a
threshold Baudio during at least n consecutive time windows
Wi = (wi ,wi+1, . . . ,wi+k−1)
where k ≥ n, detection is triggered. Empirically, we found that
Baudio = 23kbit/s is sufficient to separate audio bursts from back-
ground traffic. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume our approach
will work also for systems using audio codecs with lower bandwidth
requirements than Alexa.
As shown in Table 1, LeakyPick uses predefined parameters and
packet features. We extract the packet sizes, the corresponding
MAC or IP (depending on the layer), and (implicitly) the direction
of the packet (leaving or entering the network). To evaluate the
optimal consecutive detection threshold n (Section 5.2.1), we used
a fixed window size sw = 1s, as common voice commands rarely
take less than a second. For the traffic rate threshold Baudio , we
chose 23kbit/s. This value is a sufficiently low threshold to capture
any audio and sufficiently high to discard anything else, as voice
recognition services need good voice recording quality (e.g., Alexa’s
Voice Service uses 256kbit/s, 16-bit PCM at 16kHz [4]).
4.1.2 Statistical Probing. LeakyPick uses statistical probing to re-
fine audio transmission detection by eliminating cases where traffic
bursts result from non-audio transmission. Most importantly, the
approach is generic and does not need a priori knowledge of a de-
vice’s behavior. It also can determine if a device’s communication
behavior changes significantly in response to audio probes.
To detect devices that react to audio, we monitor network traffic
for significant changes in the device’s communication behavior in
response to audio probes. This is done by determining whether the
distribution of the properties of communication packets transmit-
ted by a device after the emission of an audio probe is statistically
different from the distribution of packets observed before the probe
injection. Specifically, LeakyPick uses a t-test [9], which is one of
the most commonly used statistical tests. Given two data samples,
the test computes a t-score by determining the data samples’ dis-
tributions’ means and standard deviations, and mapping this to a
p-value. If the p-value is below a specified threshold, the distribu-
tions are considered statistically different and therefore indicate
that the device reacted to the audio probe.
First, the probing device monitors idle device traffic while it is
not emitting audio probes. It captures a sequence
Ts = (pck1,pck2, . . . ,pckn )
of duration d seconds of data packets pcki and calculates a packet
size (or inter-arrival time) distribution vector
®Fs = (f1, f2, . . . , fk )
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by binning the packetspi ∈ Ts into k bins based on the size (or inter-
arrival time) of these packets1 and where fi denotes the number of
packets assigned to the i-th bin.
The probing device then emits multiple audio probes and cap-
tures associated data traffic
Tpr = (pck1,pck2, . . . ,pckn )
of duration d seconds and extracts a packet size (time) distribution
vector ®Fpr using the same binning as for ®Fs . The packet size vectors
®Fs and ®Fpr are then used in the t-test to determine a p-value (p)
indicating the likelihood that both frequency samples originate
from the same distribution (i.e., from the distribution the device
produces while in idle mode).
If the p-value is below a specified threshold t (i.e., p < t ), we as-
sume the traffic samples are not from the same distribution. That is,
the device has reacted in some way and changed its communication
behavior. To further refine the results, the p-value resulting from
the packet size distribution is combined with the p-value of the
inter-arrival time distribution. However, as shown in Section 5.2.2,
only using the p-value of the packet size distribution is sufficient.
We collected idle data samplesTs from multiple voice-controlled
devices and discovered that they contained frequently occurring
smaller data bursts (possibly related to, e.g., heartbeat messages)
and infrequently occurring larger data bursts (e.g., state synchro-
nization). This observation indicates it is possible to capture a large
data burst in one of the two samples (Ts or Tpr ) while missing it
in the other. Therefore, when encountering a p-value indicating
a possible reaction of the IoT device, the probing test must be re-
peated several times to ensure the observed device behavior change
is caused by the audio probe and not by background traffic bursts.
Table 1 shows the parameters and packet features used for statis-
tical probing. As with burst detection, we extract the packet sizes,
the corresponding MAC or IP, and (implicitly) the direction of the
packets from the recorded traffic. Additionally, we extract packet
inter-arrival times. As discussed in Section 5.2.2, we set the p-value
threshold t to be 0.42-0.43 to achieve an optimal precision while
fixing the packet sequence duration to d = 60 seconds.
4.2 Wake-Word Selection
Users are not always aware of IoT devices that require a wake-
word before transmitting audio recordings to the cloud. While it
is possible enumerate the wake-words for known voice assistants,
recent reports of third-party contractors reviewing voice assistant
accuracy [13, 18, 23, 24, 27, 31] highlight the significance of false
voice assistant activation. Therefore, LeakyPick identifies other
wake-words that will trigger the voice detection. Note that this
approach is different than using mangled voice samples [7, 46] or
other means to attack the voice recognition process [8, 40, 49]. We
also do not want to limit LeakyPick to words sounding similar to the
known wake-words in order to confuse the voice assistant [28, 51].
Using a full dictionary of the English language is impractical. It
would take roughly 40 days to test a voice assistant with the entire
dictionary of 470,000 words [48] at a speed of one word every
seven seconds. However, by only testing words with a phoneme
1To determine the binning automatically, we use numpy.histogramwith the bin option
auto which uses the maximum of the Sturges and Freedman Diaconis Estimator.
count similar to the known wake-word, the subset of viable words
is manageable. Our intuition is that a benign device will more
likely confuse words with a similar structure. Therefore, we select
all words in a phoneme dictionary [39] with the same or similar
phoneme count than the actual wake-word. We also used random
words from a simple English word list [26]. These words are spoken
using a text-to-speech (TTS) engine.
4.3 System Implementation
The LeakyPick probing device injects audio probes into the user’s
environment and analyzes the resulting device network traffic. Our
current implementation achieves this functionality using the fol-
lowing hardware set-up. The probing device consists of a Raspberry
Pi 3B [36] connected via Ethernet to the network gateway. It is also
connected via the headphone jack to a PAM8403 [15] amplifier
board, which is connected to a single generic 3W speaker.
To capture network traffic, we use a TP-LINK TL-WN722N [45]
USB Wifi dongle to create a wireless access point using hostapd
and dnsmasq as the DHCP server. All wireless IoT devices connect
to this access point. To provide Internet access, we activate packet
forwarding between the eth (connected to the network gateway)
and wlan interfaces. Alternatively the device could sniffWi-Fi pack-
ets without being connected to the network using packet size and
MAC address as the features. This approach would also work for
foreign Wi-Fi networks, as it is not required to have the decrypted
traffic i.e., our device does not need to be connected to that network
at all: package size information is sufficient.
Finally, LeakyPick is written in Python. It uses tcpdump to record
packets on the wlan interface. We use Google’s text-to-speech (TTS)
engine to generate the audio played by the probing device.
5 EVALUATION
This section evaluate LeakyPick’s ability to detect when audio
recordings are being streamed to cloud servers. Specifically, we
seek to answer the following research questions.
RQ1 What is the detection accuracy of the burst detection and
statistical probing approaches used by LeakyPick?
RQ2 Does audio probing with a wrong wake-word influence the
detection accuracy?
RQ3 How well does LeakyPick perform on a real-world dataset?
RQ4 How does LeakyPick’s statistical probing approach compare
to machine learning-based approaches?
RQ5 Can LeakyPick discover unknown wake-words?
5.1 Experimental Setup
Our evaluation considers 8 different wireless microphone-enabled
IoT devices: 3 smart speakers, 1 security system that detects glass
breaking and dogs barking, and 4 microphone-enabled IoT devices,
namely the audio event detecting smart IP security cameras Ne-
tatmo Welcome, Netatmo Presence and Hive View as well as the
smart smoke alarm Nest Protect. Table 2 lists the specific devices.
We now describe our dataset collection and evaluation metrics.
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Table 2: Devices used for evaluation
Device Type Device Name
Smart Speaker Echo Dot (Amazon Alexa)
Google Home (Google Assistant)
Home Pod (Apple Siri)
Security System Hive Hub 360
Microphone-Enabled
IoT Device
Netatmo Welcome
Netamo Presence
Nest Protect
Hive View
5.1.1 Datasets. We used four techniques to collect datasets for
our evaluation. Table 3 overviews these four collection methodolo-
gies, as well as to which devices the datasets apply. The following
discussion describes our collection methodology.
Idle Datasets: The idle dataset was collected in an empty office room.
It consists of network traffic collected over six hours during which
the device was not actively used and no audio inputs were injected.
Controlled Datasets - Burst Detection: The controlled datasets for
burst detection were collected in an empty office room while inject-
ing audio probes approximately 100 times for each of the studied
devices. In all cases, the injected probe was the known wake-word
for the device in question. The Hive 360 Hub device does not use a
wake-word, but is activated by specific noise like dog barking and
glass shattering. For this device we therefore used recordings of
dog barking sounds to trigger audio transmission. For each device,
three different datasets were collected by varying the wake-word
invocation interval between 1, 5, and 10 minutes.
Controlled Datasets - Statistical Probing: The collection of the con-
trolled dataset for statistical probing was performed in a way similar
to the burst detection dataset. However, the experiment collected
six datasets for each device. Each dataset consisted of six hours of
invoking the wake-word at intervals ranging from two minutes
to two hours. Thereby resulting in datasets with varying ratios of
audio-related and idle background traffic.
Online Probing Datasets: Using live traffic of the 8 different devices
listed in Table 2 we randomly selected a set of 50 words out of
the 1000 most used words in the English language [16] combined
with a list of known wake-words of voice-activated devices as
possible wake-words to test. We configured our probing device
to alternatingly record silence traffic Ts and probing traffic Tpr of
one minute duration each for every wake-word in the list. Tpr was
recorded immediately after the device started playing a word from
the list repeating the word every 10 seconds in this minute.
Real-World Datasets: To create a realistic dataset for evaluation, we
collected data from the three smart speakers over a combined period
of 52 days in three different residential environments (houses). The
times for each smart speaker are listed in Table 4. During this time
period, humans used the assistants as intended by the manufacturer.
In order to evaluate the accuracy of LeakyPick, the dataset was
labeled by recording the timestamps of when the device was record-
ing audio. This was accomplished by taking advantage of the visual
indicator (e.g., a light ring that glows) that Smart speakers use to
alert the user when the voice assistant is activated in response to
voice inputs. We therefore automated the labeling process in the
Table 3: Datasets for Burst Detection, Statistical Probing, On-
line Probing and Machine Learning
Dataset Frequency Devices
Idle - Echo Dot,
Google Home,
Home Pod,
Hive 360 Hub
Controlled -
Burst Detection
1min, 5min, 10min Echo Dot,
Google Home,
Home Pod,
Hive 360 Hub
Controlled -
Statistical Probing
2min, 5min, 10min,
30min, 1h, 2h
Echo Dot,
Google Home,
Home Pod,
Hive 360 Hub
Online Probing 10s during probing
windows
all, cf. Table 2
Real-World real-world,
cf. Table 4
Echo Dot,
Google Home,
Home Pod
Table 4: Duration of collected data in different residential
environments (households) while used by humans
Amazon Echo Dot Google Home Apple Home Pod
31d 15d 15d
real-world environment by creating a small specialized device with
a light sensor to measure the visual indicator. Our device consisted
of a Raspberry Pi and a Light Dependent Resistor (LDR) in con-
junction with a LM393 [43] analogue-digital comparator. The LDR
sensor was then attached to the smart speaker’s visual indicator
and protected from environmental luminosity with an opaque foil.
This setup allowed the Raspberry Pi to record a precise timestamp
each time the device was activated and allowed us to label periods
with audio activity in the dataset accordingly.
5.1.2 Evaluation metrics. We evaluate the performance of our de-
tection approach in terms of true positive rate (TPR) and false posi-
tive rate (FPR). The true positive rate is defined asTPR = TP
TP + FN
,
where TP is true positives and FN false negatives, resulting in the
fraction of audio events correctly identified as such. Similarly, false
positive rate is defined as FPR = FP
TN + FP
, where TN is the true
negatives and FP the false positives. It denotes the fraction of non-
audio events falsely identified as audio events. Ideally we would like
our system to maximize TPR, i.e., the capability to identify devices
sending audio to the cloud, while minimizing FPR, i.e., generating
as few as possible false detections of audio transmissions.
5.2 RQ1: Detection Accuracy
In this section we evaluate the detection accuracy of our two ap-
proaches: (1) burst detection and (2) statistical probing.
5.2.1 Burst Detection. To evaluate the performance of Burst De-
tection for detecting audio transmissions, we used the controlled
dataset for burst detection (Table 4) to determine its ability to detect
audio transmissions correctly.
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Figure 3: Results of BurstDetector using knownwake-words
detecting outgoing audio transmissions of Echo Dot, Google
Home, Home Pod and Hive 360 Hub on the controlled data
set
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Figure 4: The resulting p-value when traffic of devices being
invoked in intervals from 2minutes to 2 hours compared to
known silence, showing that the p-value decreases with an
increasing number of audio bursts in the traffic
Figure 3 shows the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve
for the burst detection approach. The ROC curve varies the parame-
ter n, which defines the number of consecutive windows with high
data throughput required for triggering detection (cf. Section 4.1.1),
from nmin = 1 to nmax = 8. As can be seen, with n = 5 consecutive
time windows, detection is triggered with aTPR of 96% and an FPR
of 4% (averaged over all devices). This is explained by the fact that
as mentioned in Section 3, the voice-activated devices typically send
only a small amount of data unless they are active: medium bursts
every few minutes and large bursts only every few hours when idle.
This allows Burst Detection to identify nearly all audio invocations
as they are clearly distinguishable from idle traffic, making this
approach practical for devices with such behavioral characteristics.
5.2.2 Statistical Probing. To evaluate the ability of LeakyPick to
detect whether a device reacts to audio events, we first determine
whether the statistical properties of data traffic of IoT devices when
in idle mode (i.e., not in relation to audio events) is statistically
different from the devices’ behavior when transmitting audio to
0.1
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0.42
0.5 0.6 0.7
0
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0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
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R
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Alexa Siri
Figure 5: ROC graph of comparing consecutive windows of
30 seconds of traffic of the Controlled - Statistical probing
dataset using the t-test for different p-value thresholds and
comparing the output to the actual labels of the traffic
the cloud. For this, we calculate the statistical difference of the
packet size distributions in the Idle dataset to the packet distri-
butions in the controlled datasets for statistical probing (Table 3)
using the t-test as discussed in Section 4.1.2. The results are shown
in Figure 4, showing the resulting p-value in dependence of the
frequency of invocations of the corresponding device’s wake-word.
As can be seen, for all tested voice-controlled devices, the p-value
decreases the more often the wake-word is injected, i.e., the more
audio-transmissions the dataset contains. This suggests that the
distributions of packet sizes related to audio transmission indeed
are different to the distribution of packets in the background traffic
and can be thus utilized to identify audio transmissions.
Figure 5 shows the ROC curve for our approach on the con-
trolled dataset for statistical probing (Table 4) for different p-value
thresholds. We use a sliding window approach and compare two
consecutive windows of 30 seconds duration using the test, moving
the window for 30 seconds to get the new window. We compare
the result with the actual label of this traffic region to assess if our
approach can reliably find exactly the device sending audio data. As
can be seen, for a p-value threshold of 0.42 or 0.43 a True Positive
Rate of 94% with a simultaneous False Positive Rate of 6% averaged
over all devices can be achieved for these datasets.
5.3 RQ2: Wake-Word Sensitivity
LeakyPick is designed to detect devices reacting to a specific set
of wake-words. However, as this set may be different for different
device types, a relevant question is to what degree the detection
accuracy is dependent on the presence of the correct wake-words in
the audio probes. To evaluate this aspect, we first tested LeakyPick
on the Online Probing dataset representing a live operative setting
in which a number of audio probes containing actual wake-words
were injected into the environment of an Amazon Echo device
with the target of trying to trigger a wake-word induced audio
transmission. We used the t-test as discussed in Sect. 4.1.2 to calcu-
late the p-value between consecutive samples of packet sequences
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Figure 6: LeakyPick t-testp-values for probingAmazonEcho
during 100 alternating windows of 1 minute of idle traffic
and probing with wake-word “Alexa” at 10-second intervals,
respectively
Ts and Tpr of duration d = 60 seconds each. The result of this
for 100 time window pairs is shown in Figure 6. As can be seen,
the p-values for the non-probing (i.e., “idle” time windows) range
between approximately 0.3 and 1, whereas the p-values for time
windows containing audio probes remain mostly below 0.3. This
shows that given an appropriate p-value threshold LeakyPick is
able to distinguish between “idle” traffic and audio transmissions.
To further evaluate how sensitive LeakyPick is to the use of the
right wake-words, we compiled a set of audio probes consisting
of the 50 most used English words and a set of nine known wake-
words used by the IoT devices used in our evaluation (shown in
Table 2). The set of audio probes was injected into the devices’
environment and the resulting p-values for each device evaluated.
The resulting p-values for two representative examples of used
audio probes are shown in Figure 7. The shown audio probes are
the randomly-selected word “major”, which does not correspond to
any known wake-word of any of the tested devices and the Google
Homewake-word “Hey Google”.While these examples are provided
to demonstrate the discriminative ability of our approach, similar
results apply also to other words in the list of tested audio probes.
As one can see, with ap-value threshold of, e.g., 0.5 the word "major"
would not be considered to activate any of the devices, whereas one
can clearly see that thep-value for "Hey Google" indicates a reaction
by the Google Home device. From the results we can see that only
devices responsive to a wake-word react to it which in turn can be
detected using the statistical t-test employed by LeakyPick. Note
that Nest Protect is not shown in Figure 7, as it was not activated
by any of the examined words and therefore did not transmit any
audio data.
5.4 RQ3 and RQ4: Real-World Performance
We evaluated LeakyPick on our real-world dataset containing 52
days of operation in residential environments (households) (Ta-
ble 4). In addition to using this dataset to measure the accuracy of
LeakyPick (RQ3), we also compare LeakyPick’s accuracy to that
of machine learning algorithms (RQ4). Recall from Section 3 that
0
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Figure 7: Representative examples of LeakyPickp-values for
audio probes. None of the devices react to the non-wake-
word probe “major” while only the Google Home device
shows reaction for its wake-word “Hey Google”
a key research challenge is being able to operate for unknown
devices. Since machine learning algorithms require training on
known devices, they are not appropriate to achieve our goals, as
our approach needs to be able to handle also previously unseen
device-types. That said, we use a trained machine learning algo-
rithm as a baseline, hypothesizing that LeakyPick can perform at
least as well, but without the need for training.
5.4.1 ML Implementation. We tested the performance of a num-
ber of different commonly-used machine learning (ML) algorithms
for detecting audio events in the real-world dataset. We then se-
lected the classifier with the best performance to compare against
the statistical detection approach used by LeakyPick. We consider
both simple ML algorithms as well as more advanced ensemble
(i.e., Bagging and Boosting) and majority voting-based classifiers.
The ML algorithms tested include XGboost [10], Adaboost [17],
RandomForest [5], SVM with RBF kernel [47], K-NN [2], Logistic
Regression, Naïve Bayes, and Decision Tree classifiers as provided
by the the Scikit-learn ML package [1]. For each classifier, the used
hyper-parameters were tuned using the provided Grid-search and
Cross-validation processes. For constructing features for training
we extracted the sequence of packet lengths (SPL) from the traffic
flow and utilized the tsfresh tool [12] that automatically calculates
a large number of statistical characteristics from a time-ordered
sequence of packets. All experiments were conducted on a laptop
that runs Ubuntu Linux 18.04 with an Intel i7-9750H CPU with 32
GB DDR4 Memory.
5.4.2 Evaluation. For the ML approach, we used 90% of the dataset
for training and 10% for testing. In addition, we conducted a 10-fold
Cross-Validation (CV) on the training data to better evaluate the
performance of the ML classifiers. According to our experiments,
based on CV accuracy, the Random Forest Classifier provided the
best performance on our dataset, achieving 91.0% accuracy (f1-
score) on test data while 10-fold CV accuracy was 90.5%.
We also evaluated LeakyPick as described in Sect. 5.2.2 on the
same real world dataset in order to compare its performance to the
ML-based approach. The results are displayed in Figure 8, showing
the ROC curves for both approaches on the Google Home, Siri Home
Pod and Alexa Echo devices. For p-value threshold 0.43 LeakyPick
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Figure 8: ROC curves of the ML-based and LeakyPick ap-
proaches on the real-world dataset
achieves a TPR of 93% with a simultaneous FPR of 7% averaged over
all devices, compared to a best-case TPR of 95% and FPR of 9.7%
for the ML-based classifier for Alexa Echo Dot. We also found that
models are not transferable between voice assistants. For example,
training on Alexa voice traffic and using the model to identify Siri
voice traffic had around 35% precision.
As our evaluation results in Figure 8 show, ML-based models are
indeed able to detect audio events based on the traffic the devices
send out of the network. However, the evaluation also shows that
similar or even better performance can be achieved using a device-
agnostic approach as taken by LeakyPick.
Since applying this kind of a profiling approach requires dedi-
cated traffic models to be trained and included in the system for
each device type considered, its practicality in real-world scenarios
is questionable. Due to the very large and ever-growing number
of different types of voice-activated devices, this approach seems
impractical. The approach adopted in LeakyPick can achieve similar
performance without the need to employ pre-trained device-type-
specific detection models for audio event detection, providing it
much wider applicability in a wider range of environments with
diverse audio-activated device types.
5.5 RQ5: Identifying UnknownWake-Words
To demonstrate LeakyPick’s ability to identify unknown wake-
words, we performed a systematic experiment with Amazon’s
Alexa-enabled Echo Dot. As voice assistants are conceptually simi-
lar, we believe the results can be generalized to other voice-controlled
devices. We configured the Echo Dot to use the standard “Alexa”
wakeword (other options include “Computer,” “Amazon,” and “Echo”).
The experiment played different audio inputs, waiting for two sec-
onds for the visual light-ring indicator of the device to light up,
indicating the device reacted to the input. For each tested audio
input, we recorded the number of attempts that triggered a reaction.
Recall from Section 2 that Alexa-enabled devices have two states
of detection: (1) an offline model on the device, and (2) an online
model. We classify a word to be mistaken as a wake-word when
the word triggers at least the offline model, since this transmits
recorded audio to the cloud.
Results. The Alexa-enabled Echo Dot reliably reacted to 89 words
across multiple rounds of testing. Table 5 (Appendix) shows the full
list of words. To estimate the phonetic distance between these words
and the true wake-word, we used the Metaphone algorithm [35] to
convert the words into a phonetic alphabet based on their pronun-
ciation. The resulting words were then compared with the Leven-
shtein distance to “Alexa.” Among the 89 words, 52 have a phonetic
distance of 3 or more. We found that 3 words had a phonetic dis-
tance of 0, 9 a distance of 1, 25 a distance of 2, 29 a distance of 3, 14
a distance of 4, 2 a distance of 5 and 6, 4 of 7 and one even a distance
of 8. These distances shows that the Echo Dot reliably reacted to
words that are phonetically very different than “Alexa.” Based on
these findings, it is unsurprising that Alexa-enabled devices are
often triggered unintentionally, leading to private conversations
and audio being transmitted outside the user’s home.
6 DISCUSSION
Burst Detector: A malicious audio bug device whose sole purpose
is to eavesdrop on a victim may use extensive lossy audio com-
pression to keep the traffic rate below the detection threshold of
23kbit/s used in this paper. However, such audio may not be suit-
able anymore for automated voice recognition as many features of
the voice are deleted or exchanged with noise which impairs the
scalability of such an attack dramatically. However, our statistical
probing approach would still detect a significant difference in the
traffic and detect the sent audio.
Statistical Probing: As mentioned in Section 2, attacks aiming to
issue commands to a victim’s voice assistant can be detected by
LeakyPick. To achieve that, increasing the time traffic samples are
acquired as well as disabling audio probing is needed. By disabling
the audio probing mechanism, every invocation of the device must
be done by an external entity (e.g., the user or an attacker). By
increasing the sample size, it is also possible to distinguish reliably
between an actual invocation and background traffic spikes, even
without the knowledge of when audio is played or not as the p-
values are different for an invocation and background noise (cf.
Figure 4). With this tweak, LeakyPick would also be able to warn
the user of such attacks.
Countermeasures against Devices sending Audio: Depending
on whether LeakyPick acts as the gateway of the home network
or is sniffing passively the (encrypted) Wi-Fi traffic, there are dif-
ferent approaches to prevent a device from recording and sending
audio without the user’s permission. If our device is replacing the
gateway, traffic identified as containing audio recordings can be sim-
ply dropped at the network layer. If our device can only passively
sniff encrypted MAC layer traffic, inaudible microphone jamming
techniques could be used to prevent the device from recording
unsuspecting users private conversations [30, 37, 38, 42, 50].
Wake-Word Identification:We found that some of the identified
wake-words for Alexa are only effective if spoken by Google’s TTS
voice, and that we were unable to replicate the effect when spoken
by a human (e.g., the word “letter”). We believe this may result from
features that differ between the TTS service audio file and natural
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voice. However, the goal of the experiment was to demonstrate the
extent to which words are incorrectly interpreted as wake-words,
rather than determining the actual words triggering incorrect wake-
word detection. Theremay also be wake-words, sounds, or noise our
approach could not find. We are currently investigating whether
wrongly recognized wake-words could be used to attack voice
assistants and other voice recognition applications.
7 RELATEDWORK
Existing works discussing detection of inadvertent data transmis-
sions out of a user network so far have focused on IP cameras. To
the best of our knowledge, there are no published approaches for
detecting outgoing audio traffic for voice assistants and other audio-
activated devices, in particular approaches utilizing audio probing.
We are also not aware of publications utilizing audio probes to
determine if devices react to audio inputs.
In the following we therefore focus on existing attacks on voice
assistants as well as traffic analysis approaches for IoT device iden-
tification and IP camera detection. Moreover, we also review ap-
proaches to microphone jamming, which can be utilized by LeakyP-
ick to preventmicrophone-enabled IoT devices to recordmeaningful
audio when the user is not aware of it.
IP Camera Detection: IP camera detection approaches usually
extract features from packet headers. Wireless cameras in operation
continuously generate camera traffic flows that consist of video
and audio streams. The resulting traffic patterns of IP cameras
are likely to be different and easily distinguishable from that of
other network applications. Furthermore, to save bandwidth, IP
cameras utilize variable bit rate (VBR) video compression methods,
like H264. Because of the use of VBR, by changing the scene the
cameramonitors a change in the bitrate of the video can be enforced.
Finally, by correlating scene changes and traffic bitrate changes
cameras, monitoring can be identified.
Cheng et al. [11] propose using the person being monitored to
change the scene by letting them move around. The resulting traffic
is then classified using machine learning. Similarly Liu et al. [29]
focus on altering the light condition of a private space to manipulate
the IP camera’s monitored scene. The resulting stream also changes
its bitrate and can therefore be distinguished from non-altered
streams, e.g., by using the statistical t-test. The above proposals are
completely orthogonal to our approach, as they are customized for
cameras. In addition, they make assumptions that are not applicable
to microphone-enabled IoT devices, e.g., utilizing a variable bit rate
encoding (VBR) and continuous data transmission.
Traffic Analysis: Numerous classification techniques have been
proposed to learn the behavior of IoT devices, distinguishing and
identifying IoT devices based on their traffic profile. Sivanathan
et al. [41] use network traffic analysis to characterize the traffic
corresponding to various IoT devices. They use the activity pattern
(traffic rate, burstiness, idle duration) and signalling overheads
(broadcasts, DNS, NTP) as features to distinguish between IoT and
non-IoT traffic. However, the approach requires training.Nguyen et
al. [33] propose an autonomous self-learning distributed system for
detecting compromised IoT devices. Their system builds on device-
type-specific communication profiles without human intervention
nor labeled data which are subsequently used to detect anomalous
deviations in devices’ communication behavior, potentially caused
by malicious adversaries. However, the proposed approaches are
not applicable to our system, as these proposals focus on detecting
anomalous behavior not consistent with benign device actions. In
contrast, our goal is to detect benign actions in response to audio
events, whichmay ormay not be falsely detected. Also our approach
does not require the system to identify IoT devices based on their
traffic.
Eavesdropping Avoidance: Microphone, and more specifically,
voice assistant jamming attacks have been proposed by several
prior works. Roy et al. [37] present an approach for inaudibly in-
jecting audio to jam spy microphones using ultrasonic frequencies
and ultrasound modulated noise. As it is inaudible to humans, the
jamming is not interfering with human conversations. Zhang et
al. [50] build upon this work to inaudibly inject commands into
voice assistants, demonstrating that voice assistants and possibly
other commodity IoT devices are susceptible to the proposed ultra-
sonic control. Mitev et al. [30] further build upon these findings
to precisely jam human voice and inject recorded voice into voice
assistants. As discussed in Section 6, inaudible jamming approaches
could be used by LeakyPick to prevent a device from recording
meaningful audio when the user is not aware of it. In future work
we aim to use these approaches as an additional component of
LeakyPick, further increasing the privacy gains of our approach.
Voice Assistant Attacks: Voice assistants using voice recognition
are fairly new and many security and privacy aspects are still to be
improved.The common goal of such attacks is to control the voice
assistant of a user without him noticing.Diao et al. [14] present
attacks against the Google Voice Search (GVS) app on Android. A
malicious app on the smart phone can activate GVS and simulta-
neously play back a recorded or synthesized command over the
built-in speakers which is then picked up by the microphone, to
control the victim’s voice assistant. Alepis et al. [3] extend upon this
attack. They then proceed to use use multiple devices to overcome
implemented countermeasures by showing that infected devices
can issue commands to other voice-activated devices such as the
Amazon Echo or other smart phones.
Vaidya et al. [46] present a method to change a recording of
human voice so that it is no longer comprehensible by humans but
still correctly recognizable by voice recognition systems. Carlini et
al. [7] extended this work by presenting voice mangling on a voice
recognition system where the underlying mechanics are known,
resulting in a more precise attack. Since a mangled voice may alert
nearby users, Schönherr et al. [40] and Yuan et al. [49] propose
methods for hiding commands inside other audio files (e.g., music
files) such that they are not recognizable by humans. Similarly,
Carlini et al. [8] create audio files with similar waveforms, which
Mozilla’s DeepSpeech interprets as different sentences.
Voice assistant extensions have also been attacked. Kumar et
al. [28] showed that utterances exist such that Alexa’s speech-to-
text engine systematically misinterprets them. Using these findings
they proposed Skill Squatting, which tricks the user into opening
a malicious Skill. Simultaneously, Zhang et al. [51] proposed us-
ing malicious Skills with a similarly pronounced or paraphrased
invocation-name to re-route commands meant for that Skill.
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These attacks show that an attacker is able to manipulate the
interaction flow with a voice assistant by, e.g., issuing commands
without the victim noticing, turning voice assistants into a potential
privacy and security risk for the user. LeakyPick can warn the user
if their voice assistant is under attack without him noticing it. When
combinedwith eavesdropping avoidance (e.g., jamming), the attacks
could be mitigated or even prevented.
8 CONCLUSION
As smart home IoT devices increasingly adopt microphones, there is
a growing need for practical privacy defenses. In this paper, we pre-
sented the LeakyPick architecture that enables detection of smart
home devices that stream recorded audio to the Internet without the
user’s consent. Conceptually, LeakyPick periodically “probes” other
devices in its environment and monitors the subsequent network
traffic for statistical patterns that indicate audio transmission. We
built a prototype of LeakyPick on a Raspberry Pi and demonstrate
an accuracy of 94% in detecting audio transmissions from eight
different devices with voice assistant capabilities without any a
priori training. It also identified 89 words that could unknowingly
trigger an Amazon Echo Dot to transmit audio to the cloud. As
such, LeakyPick represents a promising approach to mitigate a real
threat to smart home privacy.
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A FOUNDWAKE-WORDS
Full results of testing the Alexa wake-word (Alexa) with words of
the English language dictionary with 6 and 5 phonemes as well as
some random words, is shown in Tab. 5. The results shown are the
last round of 10 tests for each word. The left column shows the
probability of the device being activated while replaying 10 times
the word in question.
Table 5: Full results of testing the voice assistant Alexa with
English words
Probability of activating Alexa Wake-Word
2/10 alita, baxa, elater, hexer, liker,
ochna, taxer
3/10 bertha, electroceramic, excern,
oxer, taxir
4/10 electrohydraulic, electro-
pathic, wexler
5/10 blacksher, electic, hoaxer
6/10 bugsha, elatha, elator,
electrodissolution, elec-
trostenolytic, eloper, eluted,
fluxer, huerta, hurter, irksome,
lecher, lefter, lepre, lesser,
letter, licker, lipper, loasa,
loker, lotor, lyssa, maloca,
maxillar, melosa, meta, metae,
muleta, paxar, rickner
7/10 alexy, crytzer, electroanalyti-
cal, hyper, kleckner, lecture,
likker, volupte, wexner
8/10 electroreduction, hiper, wech-
sler
9/10 aleta, alexa, alexia, annection,
elatcha, electre, kreitzer
10/10 alachah, alexipharmic, alexi-
teric, alissa, alosa, alyssa, bar-
ranca, beletter, elector, electra,
electroresection, electrotele-
graphic, elissa, elixir, gloeck-
ner, lechner, lecter, lictor, lxi,
lxx, mixer, olexa, walesa
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